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241 
Kiobel and Extraterritoriality: 







Analysis of recent judicial decisions applying the presumption 
against extraterritoriality indicates that U.S. courts and commentators 
invoke at least four different rationales for the presumption: an 
international law rationale; a domestic political science rationale; an 
international relations rationale; and a domestic judicial policy 
rationale. This Essay briefly discusses each rationale and its 
application to Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.
1
 I conclude that 
neither of the first two rationales offers a persuasive justification for 
applying the presumption against extraterritoriality to limit 
extraterritorial application of the Alien Tort Statute (ATS)
2
 in Kiobel. 
The U.S. Supreme Court purported to apply an international relations 
rationale in Kiobel, but that rationale requires judicial deference to 
the foreign policy judgment of the political branches, and the 
majority in Kiobel defied the Obama Administration‘s foreign policy 
preferences. Finally, I conclude that the domestic judicial policy 
rationale is problematic because it manifests judicial hostility to 
democratic lawmaking.  
I. THE INTERNATIONAL LAW RATIONALE 
Historically, the presumption against extraterritoriality began as 
a presumption against extra-jurisdictionality.
3
 In other words, it was a 
presumption that courts should not apply U.S. law extraterritorially in 
 
† 
Professor of Law and Director, Center for Global Law and Policy, Santa Clara University School 
of Law. 
1. 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013). 
2. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006). 
3. See John H. Knox, A Presumption Against Extrajurisdictionality, 104 AM. J. INT‘L L. 
351, 352 (2010) (―For most of U.S. history, the Supreme Court . . . . applied a presumption 
against extrajurisdictionality: that is, a presumption that federal law does not extend beyond 
the jurisdictional limits set by international law.‖ (footnote omitted)). 
11-Sloss 8/28/2013  9:26 PM 
242 MARYLAND JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [VOL. 28:241 
 
 
violation of international legal rules limiting the jurisdictional reach 
of national laws.
4
 Throughout the nineteenth century, international 
law imposed strict jurisdictional limits on the extraterritorial 
application of domestic statutes.
5
 In practice, the presumption against 
extraterritoriality was an application of the Charming Betsy canon
6—
a canon that encouraged courts to construe U.S. statutes in 
conformity with international legal rules.
7
 
During the first half of the twentieth century, the international 
law rationale for the presumption against extraterritoriality became 
untenable because international law changed. The Permanent Court 
of International Justice decided the Lotus case in 1927.
8
 Lotus 
established a permissive rule: states can apply their laws 
extraterritorially unless there is a specific prohibition barring the 
extraterritorial application of domestic law. The court said:  
Far from laying down a general prohibition to the 
effect that States may not extend the application of 
their laws and the jurisdiction of their courts to 
persons, property and acts outside their territory, 
[international law] leaves them in this respect a wide 
measure of discretion which is only limited in certain 
cases by prohibitive rules . . . .
9
  
After Lotus, international law no longer imposed strict limits on the 





5. David L. Sloss, Michael D. Ramsey & William S. Dodge, International Law in the 
Supreme Court to 1860, in INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE U.S. SUPREME COURT: CONTINUITY 
AND CHANGE 7, 38 (David L. Sloss, Michael D. Ramsey & William S. Dodge eds., 2011) 
[hereinafter CONTINUITY AND CHANGE]. 
6. See William S. Dodge, Morrison’s Effects Test, 40 SW. L. REV. 687, 687 (2011) 
(―The presumption against extraterritoriality was born from the marriage of the Charming 
Betsy canon . . . and an international law rule that jurisdiction was generally territorial.‖). 
7. See Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804) (―[A]n 
act of Congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other 
possible construction remains . . . .‖). 
8. S.S. ―Lotus‖ (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10 (Sept. 7). 
9. Id. at 19. 
10. Knox, supra note 3, at 355 n.30; see also Dan E. Stigall, International Law and 
Limitations on the Exercise of Extraterritorial Jurisdiction in U.S. Domestic Law, 35 
HASTINGS INT‘L & COMP. L. REV. 323, 331 (2012) (―In [Lotus], the Permanent Court of 
International Justice articulated the fundamental rule that prescriptive jurisdiction – the 
ability of a government to prescribe law relating to certain activity – is permissive in 
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In Kiobel, the defendants argued that international law prohibits 
U.S. courts from applying U.S. law extraterritorially to ―foreign-
cubed‖ cases—i.e., cases involving foreign plaintiffs, foreign 
defendants, and foreign conduct.
11
 This argument is clearly 
untenable. As an initial matter, it is debatable whether the Kiobel 
plaintiffs were even asking U.S. courts to apply U.S. law 
extraterritorially.
12
 Arguably, it would be more accurate to say that 
the Kiobel plaintiffs were asking U.S. courts to apply international 
law extraterritorially. If that is an accurate description of the case, 
then it is unclear why the presumption against extraterritoriality is 
even relevant.  
Setting aside that issue, this Essay assumes that Kiobel can fairly 
be characterized as a case involving the extraterritorial application of 
U.S. law. Even so, the international law rationale cannot justify 
application of the presumption against extraterritoriality in Kiobel. In 
the year 2013, there is no blanket rule of international law that 
prohibits States from enacting legislation to regulate the activities of 
foreigners in foreign countries. Nor is there any rule of international 
law that prohibits domestic courts from exercising jurisdiction over 
foreign-cubed cases. To the contrary, the universality principle is a 
widely accepted principle of international law that authorizes States 
to apply their laws extraterritorially to address heinous conduct that 
violates universal human rights norms.
13
 The universality principle is 




international law and, unless a prohibition to prescriptive jurisdiction is proved, a state may 
properly claim jurisdiction. . . . The International Court of Justice has reaffirmed the 
enduring force of this rule as recently as 2010, noting that the rule articulated in Lotus 
remains a cornerstone of the international law of jurisdiction.‖ (alteration in original)). 
11. See Supplemental Brief for Respondents at 37, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 
133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013) (No. 10-1491) (―[T]he Charming Betsy canon also bars application of 
U.S. law to a ‗foreign-cubed‘ ATS case . . . .‖).  
12. See Anthony J. Colangelo, Kiobel: Muddling the Distinction Between Prescriptive 
and Adjudicative Jurisdiction, 28 MD. J. INT‘L L. 65 (2013). 
13. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, 
§ 404 cmt. a (1987) (―Universal jurisdiction over [some] offenses is a result of universal 
condemnation of those activities and general interest in cooperating to suppress them, as 
reflected in widely-accepted international agreements and resolutions of international 
organizations. These offenses are subject to universal jurisdiction as a matter of customary 
law.‖). 
14. Id. § 404 cmt. b (―In general, jurisdiction on the basis of universal interests has been 
exercised in the form of criminal law, but international law does not preclude the application 
of non-criminal law on this basis . . . .‖); see also Donald Francis Donovan & Anthea 
Roberts, The Emerging Recognition of Universal Civil Jurisdiction, 100 AM. J. INT‘L L. 142, 
153 (2006) (―It could be said, then, that though embryonic, state practice endorsing the 
exercise of universal civil jurisdiction as a permissive customary norm is beginning to 
emerge.‖). 
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Assuming that the Kiobel plaintiffs‘ allegations are true, 
extraterritorial jurisdiction is consistent with international law 
because it falls within the scope of the universality principle. 
In sum, the universality principle authorizes states to exercise 
jurisdiction extraterritorially in cases like Kiobel. Therefore, insofar 
as the Supreme Court wants to preclude application of the ATS to 
foreign-cubed cases, it cannot legitimately invoke an international 
law rationale to justify that outcome. 
II. THE DOMESTIC POLITICAL SCIENCE RATIONALE 
In the middle of the twentieth century, when the Supreme Court 
recognized that international law no longer supported the 
presumption against extraterritoriality, the Court developed a new 
rationale for the presumption. In Foley Brothers. v. Filardo,
15
 the 
Court announced that the presumption against extraterritoriality ―is 
based on the assumption that Congress is primarily concerned with 
domestic conditions.‖16 Filardo changed the rationale supporting the 




The basic idea is straightforward. Congressmen want to get re-
elected. Hence, when they introduce legislation, they tend to focus 
primarily on how that legislation will affect their constituents.
18
 
Therefore, when courts interpret legislation, they should assume that 
Congress wanted to use the legislation to shape events domestically, 
not overseas, unless a contrary intention is manifest. This rationale 
generally makes sense as long as the presumption against 
extraterritoriality is rebuttable. However, litigants should be able to 
rebut the presumption by providing specific evidence that Congress 
enacted a particular statute to influence foreign affairs, not just to 
shape domestic affairs. 
No one seriously disputes the proposition that Congress enacted 
the ATS to influence foreign affairs. Congress‘ primary goal when it 
enacted the ATS was to reduce a source of friction with important 
 
15. 336 U.S. 281 (1949). 
16. Id. at 285. 
17. See Melissa A. Waters, International Law as an Interpretive Tool in the Supreme 
Court: 1946-2000, in CONTINUITY AND CHANGE, supra note 5, at 380, 386–88. 
18. Cf. id. at 387. 
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U.S. allies.
19
 During the 1780s, before ratification of the Constitution, 
the United States lacked a central authority capable of enforcing 
international obligations. The national government‘s inability to 
enforce international obligations created diplomatic tensions with 
both Britain and France.
20
 The Framers‘ desire to ensure effective 
enforcement of international obligations and promote harmonious 
relations with key allies was a central reason for adopting the 
Constitution.
21
 It was also the primary reason for including the ATS 
in the 1789 Judiciary Act.
22
 The legislative intention is evident on the 
face of the statute, which provides federal courts jurisdiction over 
claims by aliens who sue ―for a tort only, committed in violation of 
the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.‖23 The textual 
focus on aliens and international law demonstrates that Congress was 
concerned with foreign affairs, not domestic affairs, when it enacted 
the ATS. 
Thus, the domestic political science rationale does not support 
application of the presumption against extraterritoriality to restrict 
extraterritorial application of the ATS because the historical evidence 
demonstrates conclusively that Congress was not ―primarily 
concerned with domestic conditions‖ when it enacted the ATS.24 
III. THE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS RATIONALE 
In F. Hoffmann-La Roche v. Empagran S.A.,
25
 Justice Breyer 
asserted that U.S. courts should construe statutes so as to ―take 
account of the legitimate sovereign interests of other nations.‖26 He 
cited Charming Betsy to support this proposition, but the traditional 
Charming Betsy canon does not support his claim. The Charming 
Betsy canon focuses on international law: courts should interpret 
statutes to avoid violations of international law.
27
 Justice Breyer‘s 
analysis focuses on international relations: courts should consider the 
 
19. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 715–20 (2004) (discussing the historical 
context of the enactment of the ATS). 
20. See Sloss, Ramsey & Dodge, supra note 5, at 9–12 (discussing the conflict with 
Britain over the 1783 peace treaty and a Pennsylvania Supreme Court case involving French 
subjects). 
21. Id. at 11. 
22. See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 715–20. 
23. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006). 
24. Foley Bros. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949). 
25. 542 U.S. 155 (2004). 
26. Id. at 164. 
27. See Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804). 
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legitimate sovereign interests of other countries.
28
 Empagran is one 
of several recent cases in which Supreme Court Justices have invoked 
an international relations rationale to justify application of the 
presumption against extraterritoriality.
29
 Although the international 
relations rationale supports application of the presumption against 
extraterritoriality in some cases, it does not justify the Supreme 
Court‘s application of the presumption in Kiobel. 
In his opinion for the Court in Kiobel, Chief Justice Roberts 
invoked an international relations rationale to justify the presumption 
against extraterritoriality.
30
 He also emphasized the separation-of-
powers principles that are a key feature of the international relations 
rationale. In particular, Chief Justice Roberts referred to ―the danger 
of unwarranted judicial interference in the conduct of foreign 
policy,‖31 and warned courts to be ―wary of impinging on the 
discretion of the Legislative and Executive Branches in managing 
foreign affairs.‖32 Unfortunately, despite paying lip service to these 
important separation-of-powers principles, the Court subverted the 
very principles it claimed to endorse by adopting an opinion that is 
starkly at odds with the clearly expressed foreign policy preferences 
of the political branches. 
To be clear, my objection to the Court‘s opinion in Kiobel is not 
about the result. The Court could have justified dismissal of 
plaintiffs‘ claims by employing any one of several rationales that are 
consistent with U.S. foreign policy interests.
33
 Instead, the Court 
chose to employ a rationale that is antithetical to key U.S. foreign 
 
28. See Ralf Michaels, Empagran’s Empire: International Law and Statutory 
Interpretation in the U.S. Supreme Court of the Twenty-First Century, in CONTINUITY AND 
CHANGE, supra note 5, at 533, 534.  
29. See, e.g., Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 550 U.S. 437, 454–55 (2007); 
Pasquantino v. United States, 544 U.S. 349, 378 (2005) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
30. See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1664 (2013) (―This 
presumption ‗serves to protect against unintended clashes between our laws and those of 
other nations which could result in international discord.‘‖ (quoting EEOC v. Arabian Am. 
Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991))). 
31. Id. 
32. Id. (quoting Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 727 (2004)). 
33. See id. at 1674 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment) (concurring in the decision to 
dismiss plaintiffs‘ claims, but reasoning that the decision is justified because there are not 
―distinct American interests at issue‖ in this case, and noting that dismissal might also be 
justified in some cases on the basis of recognized doctrines of ―exhaustion, forum non 
conveniens, and comity‖). 
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policy interests—as those interests have been articulated by the 
political branches. 
After the Court ordered reargument in Kiobel, it faced a simple, 
stark choice. Should the Court adopt a bright-line rule that slams the 
door on all human rights claims against foreign defendants under the 
ATS? Or should the Court adopt a case-by-case approach that leaves 
the courthouse doors open to some human rights claims under the 
ATS?
34
 This is not a new question; it has been with us since the 
Second Circuit‘s 1980 decision in Filártiga v. Peña-Irala.35 Since 
that time, Congress and several presidents have made it abundantly 
clear that they favor the case-by-case approach, not the bright-line 
rule, because the case-by-case approach furthers the U.S. foreign 




Despite clear evidence that Congress and the Executive Branch 
favor the case-by-case approach, the Court in Kiobel adopted a 
bright-line rule that it is never appropriate for federal courts acting 
―under the ATS to provide a cause of action for conduct occurring in 
the territory of another sovereign.‖37 The Court justified that rule by 
invoking our foreign policy interest in avoiding ―unintended clashes 
between our laws and those of other nations which could result in 
international discord.‖38 The Court was undoubtedly right to note that 
overly aggressive judicial enforcement of human rights claims under 
the ATS could generate unwanted international discord. But the 
Kiobel majority was seemingly blind to factors weighing on the other 
side of the balance. Its bright-line rule undermines our foreign policy 
interest in promoting vigorous enforcement of human rights norms by 
slamming the door on virtually all human rights litigation under the 
ATS. The political branches have determined that our foreign policy 
requires a sensitive, case-by-case balancing of competing interests. 
Kiobel upended that balance. 
 
34. The Court‘s decision in Kiobel does not affect human rights claims under the Torture 
Victim Protection Act, nor does it affect human rights litigation in state courts. However, 
those claims do not rely on the ATS. Absent further congressional legislation, the only 
human rights claims that can be litigated under the ATS in the wake of Kiobel are claims 
against domestic government officials. Claims against domestic officials have constituted a 
small fraction of ATS litigation over the past three decades. See generally BETH STEPHENS ET 
AL., INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LITIGATION IN U.S. COURTS 281–307 (2d ed. 2008). The 
plaintiffs in those cases almost always lose. See id.  
35. 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir.1980). 
36. See infra notes 39–54 and accompanying text. 
37. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1669. 
38. Id. at 1664 (quoting EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991)). 
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The relevant legislative materials demonstrate that Congress has 
endorsed the case-by-case balancing approach to human rights 
litigation under the ATS. Congress enacted the Torture Victim 
Protection Act (TVPA)
39
 in 1992, largely in response to a circuit split 
concerning the appropriate judicial response to ATS human rights 
litigation. In Filártiga, the Second Circuit adopted a case-by-case 
approach that opened the federal courts to some human rights claims 
under the ATS.
40
 In a separate concurring opinion in Tel-Oren v. 
Libyan Arab Republic,
41
 Judge Robert Bork advocated a bright-line 
rule that would bar all ATS claims, absent express congressional 
authorization.
42
 The legislative history of the TVPA leaves no doubt 
that Congress enacted the statute to repudiate Judge Bork‘s bright-
line rule, and to endorse the Second Circuit‘s case-by-case balancing 
approach in Filártiga.
43
 The statute specifically authorized claims by 
or on behalf of victims of torture and summary execution.
44
 
Additionally, both the House and Senate Reports stated, ―claims 
based on torture or summary executions do not exhaust the list of 
actions that may appropriately be covered by [the ATS].‖45 For 
emphasis, the House Report added, ―[The ATS] should remain intact 
to permit suits based on other norms that already exist or may ripen 
in the future into rules of customary international law.‖46 
Both Filártiga and Tel-Oren involved claims based on ―conduct 
occurring in the territory of another sovereign.‖47 Moreover, the text 
of the TVPA specifically addresses actions taken ―under actual or 
apparent authority, or under color of law, of any foreign nation.‖48 
Viewed in this context, it is hard to imagine how the Senate and 
 
39. Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73 (1992) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note (2006)).  
40. See Filártiga, 630 F.2d at 882–85. 
41. 726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984). 
42. Id. at 798 (Bork, J., concurring). 
43. See S. REP. NO. 102-249, at 3–5 (1991); H.R. REP. NO. 102-367, at 3–4 (1991), 
reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 84, 85–86; see also Ryan Goodman & Derek P. Jinks, 
Filártiga’s Firm Footing: International Human Rights and Federal Common Law, 66 
FORDHAM L. REV. 463, 513–23 (1997) (providing a detailed review of the legislative history 
of the TVPA, and demonstrating that Congress endorsed the Filártiga approach). 
44. See 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note.  
45. S. REP. NO. 102-249, at 5; H.R. REP. NO. 102-367, at 4, reprinted in 1992 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 84, 86. 
46. H.R. REP. NO. 102-367, at 4, reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 84, 86; see also S. REP. 
NO. 102-249, at 5 (stating that the ATS ―should remain intact‖). 
47. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1669 (2013). 
48. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note. 
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House Reports accompanying the TVPA could have provided a 
clearer expression of congressional intent. Congress unmistakably 
wanted to preserve the option for future plaintiffs to bring ATS 
claims based on conduct occurring in other countries to vindicate 
human rights norms other than torture and summary execution. 
Moreover, Congress sought to preserve human rights litigation under 
the ATS to promote U.S. foreign policy goals—specifically, ―to carry 
out obligations of the United States under the United Nations Charter 
and other international agreements pertaining to the protection of 
human rights.‖49 
In addition to Congress, the Executive Branch has also endorsed 
the case-by-case balancing approach to ATS claims involving human 
rights abuses committed on the territory of a foreign sovereign. The 
Obama Administration filed two amicus briefs in Kiobel.
50
 In the 
second brief, the Solicitor General argued that ―the Court should not 
articulate a categorical rule foreclosing any such application of the 
ATS‖ to human rights violations committed on the territory of a 
foreign state.
51
 Instead, he counseled, ―claims based on conduct in a 
foreign country should be considered in light of the circumstances in 
which they arise.‖52 The position articulated by the Solicitor General 
is not based exclusively on legal analysis; it reflects the considered 
foreign policy judgment of the Executive Branch. Specifically, the 
brief states, ―it is the view of the Department of State that 
recognizing a cause of action in the circumstances of Filártiga is 
consistent with the foreign relations interests of the United States, 
including the promotion of respect for human rights.‖53  
All human rights claims against foreign defendants under the 
ATS involve a tension between competing foreign policy objectives. 
On the one hand, every Republican and Democratic president since 
Jimmy Carter has endorsed the principle that the United States should 
use its influence in foreign affairs to promote vigorous enforcement 
 
49. Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-256, pmbl., 106 Stat. 73, 73 
(1992).  
50. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Kiobel, 133 S. 
Ct. 1659 (No. 10-1491); Supplemental Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in 
Partial Support of Affirmance, Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. 1659 (No. 10-1491). 
51. Supplemental Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Partial Support of 
Affirmance, supra note 50, at 4. 
52. Id. at 5; see also id. at 6 (noting that there are circumstances in which a court may 
recognize a federal common law cause of action based on the ATS for extraterritorial 
violations of the law of nations). 
53. Id. at 13. 
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of international human rights norms.
54
 This principle supports a more 
plaintiff-friendly approach to ATS litigation that ―leaves the door 
ajar‖ for some human rights claims under the ATS.55 On the other 
hand, if U.S. courts are overly receptive to ATS claims, ATS 
litigation could become a troubling source of tension between the 
United States and important allies.
56
 This factor weighs in favor of a 
more defendant-friendly approach to ATS litigation. Prior to Kiobel, 
the lower federal courts, as well as the Supreme Court itself in Sosa, 
adopted a case-by-case approach that struck a balance between these 
competing foreign policy goals. 
Despite the Obama Administration‘s forceful argument that the 
case-by-case approach is the best way to advance the United States‘ 
foreign policy agenda, and despite compelling evidence that 
Congress endorsed this approach when it adopted the TVPA, the 
Supreme Court in Kiobel chose to defy Congress and the President by 
adopting a bright-line rule that blocks virtually all human rights 
litigation under the ATS. The Court professed fealty to the principle 
that courts should not impinge ―on the discretion of the Legislative 
and Executive Branches in managing foreign affairs.‖57 But the 
Court‘s judicially created bright-line rule significantly limits the 
range of Executive discretion by removing one tool—case-by-case 
support for ATS litigation—that several presidents have found to be a 
useful tool for communicating the United States‘ support for vigorous 
enforcement of international human rights norms. Thus, the Supreme 
Court decision in Kiobel contravenes core separation-of-powers 
principles. In a case raising sensitive foreign policy concerns, the 
Supreme Court had the audacity to invoke a judicial foreign policy 
rationale to support a legal position directly contrary to the clearly 
expressed foreign policy preferences of the federal political branches. 
 
54. See generally DAVID WEISSBRODT ET AL., INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS: LAW, 
POLICY, AND PROCESS 672–701 (4th ed. 2009). 
55. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 729 (2004) (―Whereas Justice Scalia 
sees these developments as sufficient to close the door to further independent judicial 
recognition of actionable international norms, other considerations persuade us that the 
judicial power should be exercised on the understanding that the door is still ajar subject to 
vigilant doorkeeping . . . .‖). 
56. See, e.g., Matar v. Dichter, 563 F.3d 9 (2d Cir. 2009) (dismissing ATS claims against 
a former high-ranking Israeli government officer). 
57. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1664 (2013) (quoting Sosa, 
542 U.S. at 727). 
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IV. THE DOMESTIC JUDICIAL POLICY RATIONALE 
The stark contrast between Chief Justice Roberts‘ foreign 
relations rhetoric and his willful disregard for the actual foreign 
policy preferences of the political branches suggests that there may 
be a different, unstated rationale for the Court‘s extraterritoriality 
holding in Kiobel. Professor Paul Stephan has suggested one possible 
rationale to explain the presumption against extraterritoriality. He 
argues that the modern Supreme Court ―has concluded that there is 
something exceptional and possibly unwise about the way the United 
States conducts civil litigation.‖58 Professor Stephan notes that 
―unique features of U.S. civil justice include a right to a jury trial, no 
risk that plaintiffs will pay the other side‘s attorneys fees, generous 
and intrusive pretrial discovery, the class action device, and the 
possibility of super-compensatory recoveries.‖59 These features of the 
U.S. civil litigation system, which are not present in most other 
advanced industrial democracies, tend to tilt the scales in favor of 
plaintiffs. For that reason, among others, several of the United States‘ 
closest allies have objected to the extraterritorial application of U.S. 
laws.
60
 Professor Stephan contends that the Court shares their 
concerns. He says, ―The modern Court has not sought to undo the 
progressive reforms of civil litigation . . . . It has, however, tried to 
construct boundaries on civil litigation, especially in areas that entail 
substantial judicial discretion and modest legislative guidance.‖61 
Thus, the presumption against extraterritoriality can be understood as 
one of the boundaries the Court has erected to restrain the perceived 
excesses of the U.S. civil litigation system. 
The Court‘s effort to constrain civil litigation links its 
extraterritoriality jurisprudence to its ATS jurisprudence. In Sosa, the 
Court held that the ATS authorizes federal courts to create a federal 
common law cause of action to enforce international norms,
62
 but the 
Court sharply limited the scope of that cause of action and urged 
 
58. Paul B. Stephan, Response Essay – Empagran: Empire Building or Judicial 
Modesty?, in CONTINUITY AND CHANGE, supra note 5, at 553. 
59. Id. at 554. 
60. For example, in Kiobel, the Dutch and British governments filed an amicus brief 
highlighting the unique features of the U.S. civil litigation system and urging the Court to 
impose restraints on the extraterritorial application of the ATS. See Brief of the Governments 
of the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern 
Ireland as Amici Curiae in Support of Neither Party at 5–6, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch 
Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013) (No. 10-1491). 
61. Stephan, supra note 58, at 555. 
62. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 724. 
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lower courts to be cautious in exercising their statutory authority.
63
 In 
Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd.,
64
 the Court applied the 
presumption against extraterritoriality to limit the ability of private 
plaintiffs to bring civil suits to enforce federal securities laws.
65
 In 
both cases, judicially imposed limits on civil suits to enforce federal 
statutes—the Alien Tort Statute in Sosa and the Securities Exchange 
Act in Morrison—manifest the Court‘s desire to erect boundaries to 
constrain the perceived excesses of private civil litigation. 
I cannot say that Professor Stephan‘s analysis is incorrect, but I 
believe it is incomplete. A more comprehensive analysis would have 
to account for the large body of case law in which the Court has 
enthusiastically endorsed civil litigation as a tool to enforce judicially 
created constitutional norms. An analysis along these lines might be 
summarized in three points. First, the Court uses its control over the 
litigation process to encourage civil litigation in which plaintiffs seek 
to enforce judicially created constitutional norms—especially 
constitutional norms that restrict Congress‘ lawmaking power.66 
Second, the Court uses its control over the litigation process to create 
obstacles for civil plaintiffs who seek to enforce democratically 
created statutory norms embodied in federal legislation enacted by 
Congress.
67
 Third, as exemplified by its recent decision in Kiobel, the 
Court uses its control over the litigation process to create obstacles 




A detailed defense of these claims is well beyond the scope of 
this Essay. Even so, a comparison of two recent Supreme Court 
decisions involving federal health care regulation illustrates the 
central point. In Douglas v. Independent Living Center of Southern 
 
63. Id. at 725–28.  
64. 130 S. Ct. 2869 (2010). 
65. Id. at 2881–83. 
66. See, e.g., Nat‘l Fed‘n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012) (holding that 
the Medicaid expansion provisions of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act 
exceeded Congress‘ power under the Spending Clause); Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 
876 (2010) (holding that federal statute barring independent corporate expenditures for 
electioneering communications violated the First Amendment). 
67. See, e.g., Morrison, 130 S. Ct. 2869 (restricting extraterritorial application of federal 
securities laws); F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155 (2004) 
(restricting extraterritorial application of federal antitrust law). 
68. See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013). 
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California, Inc.,
69
 plaintiffs sued to enforce a provision of the federal 
Medicaid statute.
70
 Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito joined a 
dissent authored by Chief Justice Roberts in which he argued that the 
plaintiffs lacked a private right of action
71
 and therefore could not 
bring suit to enforce a federal statutory norm. According to the 
dissent, plaintiffs cannot sue to enforce a statutory norm endorsed by 
Congress unless they can also identify a statute that explicitly 
authorizes them to file suit.
72
 (In fact, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is a federal 
statute that authorized private lawsuits in cases like Douglas until the 
Supreme Court adopted a narrowing construction that restricted the 
use of § 1983 to enforce federal statutory norms.)
73
  
Compare Douglas to National Federation of Independent 
Business v. Sebelius,
74
 where private plaintiffs sued to invalidate key 
provisions of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act. By 
asking the Court to invalidate a federal statute, the plaintiffs 
effectively invited the Court to engage in constitutional lawmaking, 
an invitation that the Court eagerly accepted.
75
 In Sebelius, the 
plaintiffs could not identify any statute that authorized them to file 
suit. Even so, no Justice questioned whether they had a private right 
of action. Under current Supreme Court doctrine, plaintiffs do not 
need statutory authorization to file a suit in which they invite a court 
to engage in constitutional lawmaking to invalidate a democratically 
enacted federal statute. However, plaintiffs do need statutory 
authorization to file a suit in which they ask a court to enforce a 
democratically enacted federal statute.
76
 Thus, the Court‘s private 
right of action doctrine privileges judicial lawmaking over 
 
69. 132 S. Ct. 1204 (2012). 
70. Id. at 1209. 
71. Id. at 1211–15 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
72. See id. at 1211–13. 
73. In Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1 (1980), the Court held that § 1983 ―was intended 
to provide a remedy, to be broadly construed, against all forms of official violation of 
federally protected rights.‖ Id. at 5 (quoting Monell v. Dep‘t. of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 
700–02 (1978)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Twenty years later, though, in Gonzaga 
University v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273 (2002), the Court effectively restricted the use of § 1983 to 
enforce (democratically created) statutory norms, while preserving § 1983 as a broad remedy 
to enforce (judicially created) constitutional norms. The question presented in Douglas 
would never even have arisen if the Court had not previously engaged in judicial policy 
making in Gonzaga to restrict the use of § 1983 to enforce statutory norms. 
74. 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012). 
75. In Sebelius, the Court created a new, unprecedented constitutional limitation on 
Congress‘ Commerce Power. Id. at 2585–93. It also held for the first time since the 1930s 
that Congress had acted beyond the scope of its constitutional power under the Spending 
Clause. See id. at 2633–40. 
76. Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 283–84. 
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democratic lawmaking: the Court has invented a set of procedural 
rules that restrict access to court for plaintiffs who seek to enforce 
democratically created statutory norms, while granting access to 
court for plaintiffs who seek to enforce judicially created 
constitutional norms. 
This pattern of judicial decision-making is deeply disturbing. 
The Supreme Court encourages federal courts to employ their judicial 
power to enforce constitutional norms created by the Supreme Court 
because the Court favors judicial lawmaking that it controls. In 
contrast, the Supreme Court erects obstacles for plaintiffs who seek 
to enforce statutory or international law norms because those norms 
are the product of lawmaking processes that the Court does not and 
cannot control. Thus, instead of portraying the Court‘s 
extraterritoriality jurisprudence as evidence of the Court‘s skepticism 
about civil litigation, as Professor Stephan suggests, one might 
reasonably conclude that the Court‘s jurisprudence manifests judicial 
hostility to democratic lawmaking processes.  
CONCLUSION 
This Essay has identified four different rationales for the 
presumption against extraterritoriality. In the nineteenth century, the 
Court invoked an international law rationale to justify the 
presumption against extraterritoriality. Today, the international law 
rationale provides little support for the Supreme Court‘s 
extraterritoriality jurisprudence because international law imposes 
very weak constraints on the extraterritorial application of U.S. law, 
whereas the Court seeks to impose much tighter constraints. In the 
mid-twentieth century the Court adopted a domestic political science 
rationale to justify the presumption against extraterritoriality. That 
rationale remains valid today, but it provides no support for those 
who seek to restrict the extraterritorial application of the ATS.  
The Court has never explicitly invoked a domestic judicial 
policy rationale to justify its extraterritoriality jurisprudence. Even 
so, Professor Stephan makes a plausible argument that the domestic 
judicial policy rationale helps illuminate the normative judgments 
implicit in the Court‘s extraterritoriality jurisprudence. However, 
instead of portraying the Court‘s extraterritoriality jurisprudence as 
evidence of the Court‘s skepticism about civil litigation, as Professor 
Stephan suggests, one might reasonably conclude that the Court‘s 
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jurisprudence manifests judicial hostility to democratic lawmaking 
processes. 
In the past decade, the Court has sometimes invoked an 
international relations rationale to justify the presumption against 
extraterritoriality. Applied with proper sensitivity, the Court could 
use the international relations rationale to support the Executive 
Branch in its careful, case-by-case balancing of competing foreign 
policy concerns. Unfortunately, in the hands of Chief Justice Roberts 
in Kiobel, the international relations rationale became a blunt weapon 
that the Court‘s majority used to impose its own foreign policy 
preferences in opposition to key foreign policy goals endorsed by the 
political branches. Congress and the President have made it 
abundantly clear that they want to use the U.S. legal system in a 
limited set of cases to help promote enforcement of widely accepted 
international human rights norms. In Kiobel, the Supreme Court 
invoked an international relations rationale to justify application of 
the presumption against extraterritoriality, and applied that 
presumption to subvert the international human rights policies of the 
federal political branches. 
